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In March 1975, Senators Cranston and Johnston introduced 
legislation (S. 1291, 94th Congi:;ess, First Session), that would create 
a National Corr..rrlission on Economic Growth and Stability, comprised 
of nine professional economists. According to the bill, the purposes 
of the Com�nission will be '1to identify major changes and long-term 
trends in the econon1y of the 1Jnited States and to propose public 
policy -respon::iive to such changes and trends, 11 
In remarks acco1npanying the introduction of the bill, Senator 
Johnston referred specifically to current energy p-roblems in. the United 
States as one of - the main sources of the m.Jtivation to establish the 
Con1mi<:i sion. Said the Senator: 11Perhaps if something like this had 
been undertaken in the 1960s we could have discovered many of the 
problems v..re a.re now facing in the 1970s and might have bett�r pre­
pared for them. If such a commission had made but on·e basic recom­
mendation -- for example, the need for energy conservation -- we 
could have avoided many of the economic hardships th_at we are now 
experien-cing. 11 
Suppose that such a· commission had been formed in 1965, and 
that it had possessed the foresight to look into the issue of American 
dependence on foreign sources of natural resources. Very probably 
the commission report would have discussed world petroleum resources, 
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and it n1ight even have recognized that the perpetual instability of the 
Middle East created the possibility that the OPEC oil cartel would gain 
power and stability. By similar reasoning, it might also have reached 
the same type of predictio.n about the world copper market. The leading 
exporters of copper -- Chile, Zambia and Zaire -- Gould all have been 
identified as in volatile political situations. A Marxist takeover in 
Chile and·a war between the black and white nations of southern Africa 
(Zambia and Zaire border then white-dominated countries, Rhodesia 
and Angel.a} were rega1·ded as possible threats in the rnid-1960s and as 
these nat�ons undertook to nationalize copper production the possibility 
of the politically-catalyzed establishment of a cartel for marketing 
copper w�s certainly not remote. A policy proposal to stockpile oil 
would, retrospectively, have been brilliant; one to stockpile copper 
would by now undoubtedly have generated a series of nasty speeches 
from Senator Proxmire. 
Information and Uncertainty 
The information base available in 1965, and even today, is 
probably not adequate to determine with certainty whether copper or 
oil or numerous othef commodities are likely to be effectively cartelized, 
Instead, policy makers must deal with a list of uncertainties and possi­
bilities. On some issues, organizations such as the proposed national 
comm�ssion of economists might be able to produce sufficient infdrma­
tion to justify the conclusion that a particular economic problem is certain 
to arise within the planning horizori of society. On others, it might 
identify inexpensive measures that would prov�de protection against 
a possible, but not certain event. But on most issues, uncertainties 
about the _future and the effectiveness of policy responses to unanticipated 
events ·are likely to prove to be in some significant measure irredu.c;:::ible, 
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and conclusions are likely to be hedged and conjectural. A particular 
event will be identifif�d as a possibility, and each alternative policy 
response will have uncertainties attached to its likely effectiveness. 
To turn the current energy problem on its head, many 
informed, intelligent scholars of the energy sector believe that the 
current energy crisis is transitory. Some believe that nuclear power, 
as it is used more extensively, will prove to be sufficiently safe and 
cheap that, in a decade or two., \Ve will have fully adjusted to current 
problems and returned to an economy based upon extensive consump­
tion of inexpensive energy. Others believe that in response to current 
oil prices new reserves will be ·discovered and exploited, causing the 
CPEC cartel to disintegrate and the price of oil to fall dramatically. 
Still others place bets on new energy sources such as geothermal 
steam, solar energy, tar sands, gasification of coal, oil '?hale, etc. 
At the same time, the prevailing mood of the country, of many scholars, 
and of most politicians is that current conditions are the best precursors 
of the future, and that American society must make fundamental 
readjustments to accon1modate a world in which energy \vill continu� 
to become increasingly expensive,. especially if environmental con­
seqll;ence s of its production and use are taken into account, 
The basic information problem underlying the current energy 
crisis is to determine future supply condit.ions with respect to energy 
resources. For more than a few years into the future, "these conditions 
are in significant measure fundamentally uncertain, which is to say that, 
try as we may, we can never gather enough information to identify a 
clearly dominant public policy towards energy because we can never 
boil do-Vil'n the nu,mber of plauSible future states of the world to a suf­
fici.ently small and hon1.ogeneous group that a single policy clearly 
dominates. (For an excellent discussion of the implications of this 
argument for nuclear power development, see Joskow, 1974.)
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Unfortunately, social scientists know very little about what 
constitutes optimal behavior under conditions of uncertainty. Generally, 
the literature in decision theory ernphasizes the following strategies: 
(a) gather more information to reduce uncertainty, {b) devise contingency 
plans for each plausible state of the world, (c) deveclop institutions that 
respond quickly and flexibly to unpredictable events and (d). concentrate 
on procedural values of decision-making processes when predicting the 
social value of their outcomes is not feasible. 
.To decide th<: extent to ·which each of these strategies should be 
employed is a normative question of great difficulty. The answer depends 
in part on the value (presumably ·negative) that affected members of 
society p,lace upon living in an uncertain world. It also depends upon 
recognizing and quantifying interrelationships among the strategies. 
For example, information gathering is in some measure a substitute 
for contihgency planning. If information is cheap compared to developing 
contingent strategies, it makes sense: to gather more information to reduce 
the number of possible states of the world for which contingencies must be 
developed. But if contingency plans are Cheap compared to information 
costs, as long as the possible states of the world have been reasonably 
identified it makes sense to sacrifice more information for more plans. 
The four strategies also are ?Ometimes inconsistent. Since 
it is all but impossible for major government policy actions to den1and 
the s'.1-me sacrifice and provide the same benefit to everyone, procedural 
equity C·�n conflict with all three of the other strategies. A le·ss obvious 
example is the potential conflict between plans and flexibility. A 
contingency plan that takes the form of directives to deciSion-makers 
contingent upon outside events may not only be useless if an unforseen 
event transpires, it may be counterproductive. The organizational 
·structure and allocation of responsibilities implicit in the plan may 
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reduce the adaptiveness of the organization to events for which no 
contingent plan was developed. 
Given these and other ve1·y complicated aspects of the problem 
of ni.aking decisions in an uncertain \VOrld, one should not expect any 
decision-making process to be identifiably optimal. This is particularly 
true in terms of ex post evaluations, since after the fact some efforts 
to gather informat�on, develop contingency plans and make organizations 
more adaptable will have been un"necessary hedges against states of the 
world that never developed, or were later shown to have been impossible. 
The only ground on which ex post evaluations of these efforts makes sense 
is with respect to their effect on the negative consequences of uncertainty 
as perceived by individuals, and such evaluations are, for all practical 
purposes, impossible either before or after the fact. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to identify some aspects of specific 
decision-making procedures that yield systematic biases in the types 
of policies adopted under conditions of uncertainty. The remainder of 
this paper is devoted to identifying some ·of these. 
The Effect of Uncertain Information· on Government Decisions 
The proposed commission of economists is typical of the 
approach normally taken by government in making policy on compli­
cated matters tjealing with sophisticated technical issues.· Political 
leaders conventionally assume, i1nplicitly, that a solution to a 
difficult policy issue can be found by applying expert analysis. The 
inability of ·government officials to identify a single, dominant policy 
option is attributed to their lack of technical expertise and their 
inability, owing to other comr.o.itments, to devote sufficient time to 
studying the matter. To solve the problem, then, requires delega­
tion of investigative and analytical responsibility, and, in the case 
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of regulatory agencies, of the power to make decisions within broad 
policy guidelines, to a specialiied group of experts. 
Although the details differ enormously across expert decision­
making institutions, the basic model is the same, Neutral, objective 
experts are commissioned to collect relevant informati.on on a parti­
cular policy issue, determine the 11truen �onsequences of alternative 
policy actions, and either recommend or implement the 11best11 policy, 
given objectives laid down by the political leaders. Only one such 
decision-making institution is normally constructed for each policy 
issue, and cinly one policy option is pursued. The institutional 
mechanisms for making energy policy, in both the regulatory and 
research and development aspects, follow this pattern. 
One consequence of this type of policy-making is that it leads 
to systematic errors in estimating the extent of uncertainty, and, as 
a result, to a misallocation of effort among uncertainty-reducing 
activities. 
Information flows into government decision-making processes 
from three types of sources. First, certain types of information are 
purchased by government through its various activities that support 
research and developme
_
nt. Second, the agencies themselves generate 
and process a substantial amount of information. Third1 formal channels 
have been developed for individuals and organizations to provide informa-
tion at their own expense, such as· by appearing at Congressional hear·ings, 
proceediilgs before executive ·regulatory authorities, and trials in. the 
court system, and by lobbying decision-makers. 
Each supplier of information has a stake in the perc.eptions of 
the extent of uncertainty on behalf of the government decision-maker. 
All other things being equal, most individuals prefer less to more 
unc.ertainty with respect to their own future. 
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The relationship between the uncertainty faced by society and 
that faced by a particular individual or organization can be very 
complicated. Fo1· exarnple, an organization established to engage in 
planning for a particular contingent event will have a stake in generating 
infor1nation that keeps that event within the set of perceived plausible 
states of the world. By contributing to the uncertainty of society it 
can reduce th� uncertainty associated with its continued prosperity; 
It will find organizational va'luc only i'n information that supports the 
perception that the contingent event is more likely to occur, as advertis­
ing executives '\vith deodorant accounts have long-since learned. 
Individuals and organizations that do not profit form societal 
uncertainty may, nevertheless, reduce their uncertaint.y by transferring 
it to others. For example, policies that- reduce uncertainty with respect 
to price usually tend to increase it with respect to employment, indirect 
acquisition costs and availability of supply, as was evident in 1974 
during the gasoline shortage. 
Strategic use of information to generate greater uncertainty 
for others as a vehicle for reducing one1s own uncertainty Would not be 
particularly troublesonie if everyone had equal access to the channels of 
inform·ation. Then, each attempt to burden a particular individual, 
group or organization with additional uncertainty would be identified by 
the recipient, and countering information would be fed� into the decision­
making process. But such an idealized model is unrealistic. 
One source of difficulty is that information is expensive. 
Resources are required to keep informed about the information entering 
the system and to generate 
.
responses to information that implies a 
societal reduction in uncertainty but, in reality, merely transfers it 
and even increases it. Vfhether an individual, group or organization 
will find it worthwhile to incur these costs depends upon its stake in 
the issue at hand. It "\Vill also depend upon the costs the organization 
faces in organizing itself to participate in the policy-making process. 
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Generally, the larger, n1.ore heterogeneous a group is, the more 
expensive will it be for th� group to become effectively organized. 
Furthermore, the larger the group the smaller the incentive of any 
individual to join it, sin.cc the success of the group in obtaining his 
desired ends is less dependent upon his own participation in and support 
of group activities. As a result, a fe\v people with an intense per capita 
interest in a particular policy problem are more likely to participate in 
the information-gathering and evaluation process than a larger number 
with a ?maller per capita interest, even though the aggregate interest of 
the latter may be in excess of that of the former. For these reasons, 
a policy issue subject to considerable uncertainties opens the door for 
small,. well-represented groups to use information strategically to 
transfer risks to large, poorly represented groups. 
Another source of difficulty is the uncertainty attached to the 
quality;of information about an issue that itself is subject to uncertainty. 
Aware of strategic possibilities in the use of information, decision­
ma�ers attempt to institute procedures for testing the quality of informa­
tion. Information generation is a highly technical a·ctivity involving the 
use of sophisticated methods fron1. numerous disciplines. No 
decision-maker is _likely to be skilled in all the relevant methods for 
generating and evaluating information. Consequently, rules of evidence 
and mechanisms for subjecting information to scrutiny by other partici­
pants in the process are developed to create procedural tests o� the 
quality of information that, in theory at least, require a narrower range 
of professional skills on the part of the decision-maker. 
These procedures do very little to protect unrepresented 
interests except insofar · as their interests overlap· those of a group that 
has decided to participate in the process. In addition, they bias the 
proc.ess in favor of established institutions and ways of doing things 
since information about existing polities and operating institutions will 
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be mor.e certain, and hence accorded greater weight, than conjectural 
information about a state of the world and a set of institutions and 
policies that do not yet exist. Implicitly this accords rr�ost of the 
burden of proof on those w ho argue the likelihood of a change in the 
state of the world and support a change in policy to accommodate that 
eventuality. 
To some degree, the thjrd source of information -- disinterested 
parties whose -pa.rticipation is fj.nanced by government through agencies 
themselves disinterested in the outcome -- can offset some of the 
informational biases in the decision-making process. They can examine 
the extent to which proposals transfer uncertainty, and they can expose 
uncertainties in the quality of information supplied by others. And 
their O\.Vn systen>atic bias -- to create a continuing demand for their 
services by emphasizing the presence of substantial but reducible 
uncertainty -- is presumably counteracted to some extent by 
the opposing interests of the represented groU.ps. In these arguments 
rests the case for public interest la'.v firms, consumer protection 
organizations, and even the proposed commission of economists 
rnentioned at the outset. 
Unfortunately, many problems are not effectively attacked 
through this mechanism. For one thing, the aDsence of a direct con­
nection between those providing purchased �nformation and the unrepre� 
sented groups· prevents them from correctly representing the extent of 
the distaste for uncertainty and the desirability of policy actions to cope 
with it among those not represented in the process. Attempts by those 
providing such information will inevitably be branded excessively 
paternalistic or i�sensitive, d.epending upon the tastes o f  the critic in 
relation, to those implicit in the purchased information. And, in any 
event, because of the b�nuous connection between the provider of the 
purchased information and the unrepresented group, the purchased 
information v.·ill be accorded less weight in the decision-making process. 
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Another continuing problem is a bias in the process toward 
preserving the status quo. rn fact, adding more participants to the 
decision-making process probably increases resistivity to change. 
}�irst, it makes decisions·. more protracted by increasing the amount of 
information decision-makers must process and by e::;panding the number 
of issues to be considered. This reduces the expected net gains accruing 
from a proposal (it pushes the benefits further into the future and increases 
the costs of participating in the 'process by extendin·g its duration and 
the amount of information it requires). and thereby the incentive to 
propose a change in policy. Second, it increases the chance that the 
rationale for and consequences of a change will be identified as uncertain, 
by addin� to the number of perspectives from which the information 
supporting the change will be viewed. 
Implicati0ns for Energy Policy 
The conclusions with respect to energy policy to be drawn 
frs>m these observations are rather straightforward. First, it makes 
a great deal of sense for the goverrunent to buy information about 
future energy supply and demand, especially through agencies with no 
particularized stake in the issue. It would be a mistake, for example, 
to allocate total responsibility for studying energy supply and demand 
to an agency whose mission is the development of new energy resources, 
such �s the Energy Re search and Development Agency, but it is surely 
correct t.o have ERDA provide information about future energy.tech­
nology to balance that from private industry. 
Efforts should be made to break information monopolies. In 
some sense, participation in the information-gathering process by 
those possessing key data should not be voluntary, and government 
Organizations should be created to serve as independen t sources of 
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estimates of the same information to place checks on the primary 
source. The most egregious example of monopolized information is 
the protection of so-called proprietary information held by corpora­
tions. The alleged reason for retaining secrecy about such data is 
that it can in sorn.e way damage competition among firms; however 
in a competitive market individual firm advantages are, ex hypothesis, 
not present. 
The real purpose of corporate secrecy is to retain anti­
competitive features of a market and to control the flo•v of information 
to the government as a mechanism to influence decisions. A.n unfortuna­
tely common scenario in hearings before. courts, commissions or 
Congress is fa:;: some piece of objective analysis illustrating the presence 
of monopolistic or other socially undesirable activities to be attacked by 
the perpetrating corForation as misleading because it is bg,sed upon 
incomplete, f:i:.·agmentary information, and then in the next breath for the 
corporation to express shock at a request to supply rnore information 
because of its proprietary nature, Detailed information on activities 
and :resources of companies when :relevant to a policy debate should be 
collected and made public as with. census data, with periodic checks 
for authenticity, b<1cked hy penalties for noncompliance. 
Regardless 0£ the success of programs to generate more 
information, it is futile to expect that information gathering alone will 
be adequate for dealing Vi.rith long-run energy policy. Conditions of 
long-run supply and dernand, especially the former, are likely to 
have important aspects that are irreducibly uncertain ·within the 
policy-planning tin1e ho1·izon. In part, this suggests the development 
of contingency plans and built-in flexibility. For exarnple, energy 
resources should be stockpiled, and some excess capacity should be 
maintained in industries that convert resources to usable energy, 
such as in oil refineries and electric power facilities. In case of an 
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unanticipated shortage in one type of energy, some immediate substitu­
tion of other energy is possible when excess capacity is present, 
With respect to investments in research, development and 
operating facilities, mixed' strategies arc called for. Automobiles with 
greater fuel flexibility, for exarnple, can cushion the ·impact of cut-backs 
in the availability of any particular fuel. Investments in several methods 
of generating electricity can smooth the transition that would follow new 
information regarding undesirable environmental effects of any particular 
technology: And the tendency to focus all support on the top-ranking of 
several R & D proposals should be avoided when others on the list have a 
significant chance of success and when the apparently most prom.ising 
alternative is still subject to considerable uncertainty. 
Finally, far rr1ore attention needs to be paid to improving our 
understanding of the relationship between th0 procedures used to make 
policy decisions and the general character of the decision outcomes. In 
designing policy-making and policy-implementing institutions, attention 
has . tended to focus on procedural values solely as ends in themselves, 
with little or no attention given to the effect that procedures can have on 
income distribution, political power and economic efficiency in a world 
where information is expensive and of uncertain quality. Unfortunately, 
the state of knowledge about the relationship between procedures and 
outcomes is too skimpy to permit much in the way of specific policy 
proposals. Perhaps here is where the academic community can contri­
bute the most to the development of public policy not only with respect to 
energy, but with respect to numeral.is other technically sophisticated 
areas of public concern as well. 
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